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liability and it has become final, the judgment may nevertheless be reviewed and reyersed on an appeal from an order
granting a new trial on the issue of dam ges only. It is
obvious that the foregoing unsound prono cements are made
in order to enable the majority to sust' its unsound position
that the trial judge committed a
88, manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion in
nting plaintiff's motion for
a new trial on tIle issue of amages only, and at the same
time to give plaintiff an portunity to seek redress for his
patently serious inju . s. In other words, the majority is
compromising on t law in order to give plaintiff an opportunity to retry . case and probably obtain a fair award of
damages. WeI commend the majority for this display
of human ndness, I cannot yield to a compromise which
will nec sarily throw the law into a state of confusion,
especi y when full justice may be accomplished by following
set d rules of law.
would affirm the order.

!

[S. F. No. 18460. In BlUlk. Oct. 9, 1952.]

ANITA FLORES et al., PlaintiiIs and Appellants, v.
ERNEST W. BROWN et a1., Defendants and Appellants.
MARIA ZAVALA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ERNEST W.
BROWN et a1., Defendants; JACK R. MURRAY, Appellant.
[1] Automobiles-Persons Liable-Employer.-Negligence of tractor owner who was towing trailer for benefit of its owner at
time of accident may be imputed to the latter only if the
former was acting as his agent or employee; if the tractor I:
owner was hauling the trailer as a mere favor to its owner, .
or as an independent contractor, negligence may not be im- 1
puted.
~

[2] See Cal.Jur., Independent Contractors, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Master IUld Servant, § 3 et seq.
licK. Dig. lteferences: [1] Automobiles, § 168; [2] Independent
Contractors, § 3; [3-5] Automobiles, § 243; [6,7] Negligence, § 97;
[8,11,13] Husband IUld Wife, § 65(1), (2); [9, 10, 14] HusblUld
IUld Wife, § 65(1); [12] Deaths, §§ 39, 59; [15] Husband and
Wife, § 189(1); [16J New Trial, § 15.
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[2] Independent Oontractors-Existence of Relationship-Bight
of Oontrol.-Primary test for determining whether a person
performing gratuitous services for another does so as the
latter's agent is the same as that applied to determine whether
one performing services for compensation does so as an employee or as an independent contractor, and in both situations
the determinative issue is whether or not the alleged principal controlled or had the legal right to control the activities
of the alleged agent.
[8] Automobiles-Evidence-Agency.-When one person is.driving
another's automobile for the latter's benefit, an inference of
agency may bl:' drawn, and right of control may be inferred
from the owner's power over the way his automobile should
be operated, particul(lrly when he is present on the trip.
[4] Id.-Evidence-Agency.-If one person is riding in another's
automobile, the right to control may not be inferred merely because the trip is undertaken for the passenger's benefit and
the destination is selected by him, nor may the right to control
be inferred merely from the fact that one person with his own
equipment is transporting another's goods.
[6] ld.-Evidence-Agency.-Where tractor owner at time of accident was towing another person's trailer with his own equipment in carrying out an apparently isolated transaction between the parties, no inference of agency may be drawn.
[6] Negligence-Imputed Negligence-Family Relationship.-Since
mother and father are equally entitled to the custody of a
minor child (Civ. Code, § 197), if negligence is to be imputed
from one to the other on an agency theory it must be because
their relationship in caring for their child is in the nature of
a joint enterprise, each being the agent of the other.
[7] ld.-Imputed Negligence-Family Relationship.-Family relationship standing alone is insufficient to convert family activities into joint enterprises for purposes of imputing negligence.
[8] Husband and Wife-Community Property-Damages for Personal Injuries.-In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a cause of action for injuries to either husband or wife
arising during the marriage and while they are living together is community property, and the same rule is applicable
to a cause of action for the wrongful death of a minor child,
or for damages suffered by the parents because of injury to
such a child.
[6] See Ca1.Jur., Negligence, §S7; Am.Jur., Negligence, §237
et seq.
[S] See Cal.Jur.l0-Yr.8upp., Community Property, § 50 et seq. j
Am.Jur., Community Property, § 36.

)
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[9] Id.-Community Property-Damages for Personal Injuries.In ease of injuries to either husband or wife during the marriage or to a minor child of the parties, it is ordinarily necessary to impute the negligence of one spouse to the other to
prevent the negligent spouse from profiting by his own wrong.
[10] Id.-Community Property-Damages for Personal Injuries.When a marriage is dissolved, the interests of the parties in
causes of action for injuries to either spouse during the marriage or for injuries to a minor child become separate property, it is possible to segregate the elements of damages that
would, except for the community property system, be considered personal to each spouse, and the objective of preventing unjust enrichment may be accomplished by barring only
the interest of the negligent spouse or his estate.
[11] Id.-Community Property-Damages for Personal Injuries.Where husband died in the same accident in which his wife
was injured and their minor son was killed, there will be no
unjust enrichment if she is allowed to recover for her personal
injuries and for the wrongful death of her son.
[12] Death-Defenses: Damages.-Damages for wrongful death
are the SUIll of those suffered by each heir or parent, and
when the heirs are not husband and wife, the negligence of
one is not imputed to the other because the recovery may be
limited to the nonnegligent heirs.
[13J Husband and Wife-Community Property-Damages for Personal Injuries.-The right to recover for personal injuries or
wrongful death of a minor child may turn on the chance of
whether or not plaintiff's spouse survives until after the statute
of limitations has run or jUdgment has been rendered, and if
the child died after his father, his mother's action for his
wrongful death could in no event be considered community
property.
[14] Id.-Community PropertY-Damages for Personal Injuries.When the husband is dead, not only is the reason for the rule
imputing his negligence to his wife gone, but to apply it defeats its own purpose.
[15] Id.-Actions-Defenses-Husband's Contributory Negligence.
-Where husband died in same accident in which his wife was
injured and their minor son was kiJIed, a complete new trial
may not properly be granted on the ground that the trial
court erred in instructing thl' jury that any lwgIigence of the
husband would not bl' a defem;e to the surviving wife's action
for the wron!!ful dc-a1.h of her son. (Disapproving Bolko v.
Jones, 117 Cal.App. 372, 3 P.2d 1028; Cossi v. Southern Pac.
Co., 11 0 Cal.App. 110, 293 P. 663; and Dull v. Atchison, T. tt
B.F. By. Co., 27 Cal.App.2d 473, 81 P.2d 158.)
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[16] New Trial-Motion for Limited New Trial-Powers of Court.
-When the issues of liability and damages are so interwoven
that a new trial limited to damages alone would be unfair to
defendant, as where the verdict in an action for the wrongful
death of deceased husband was inconsistent under the instructions given with the verdict in an action for personal injuries of the surviving wife, the trial court may order a COJllplete new trial although the only motion is by plaintiff for a
limited new trial.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County and from orders denying judgments notwithstanding verdicts and granting a new trial. Leonard R.
Avilla, Judge. Appeal from judgments dismissed j orders
affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions.
Actions for damages for wrongful death and for personal
injuries arising out of a collision of vehicles. Orders denying motion of defendant Murray for judgments notwithstanding verdicts reversed with directions; order granting
plaintiffs a new trial reversed as against defendant Murray
and affirmed as against defendant Brown.

)

i

James F. Boccardo, David S. Lull and Edward J. Niland
for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Dana, Bledsoe & Smith and Morton B. Jackson for Defendants and Appellants.
TRAYNOR, J.-On Sunday night, September 7, 1947, on
Highway 101 near Madrone, an automobile driven by Herman Flores was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by defendant Brown. Brown owned the tractor, but the trailer was
owner by defendant Murray. With Mr. Flores in the front
seat of thc automobile was his wife, who was holding a baby;
in the back, which had been converted into a small truck bed,
were their son Felipe (19 years of age), their daughter Anit~ .
(14 years of age), and a friend, Nellie Zavala (17 years of
age). Mr. Flores, Felipe, and Nellie Zavala were killed; Mrs. :
Flores and Anita ",el'e injured.
As a result of the aceiJent, five Refiolls were filed ngainst
BI'own 1I1111l\Illl'l'ay: the first by Mrs. Flores 8nd her snrviving'
t'lJildrl'll fol' the death of MI'. l"lorrs; the s(lrontl by Mr8. Flori'S
for her }w]'sonal injlll'irs; thr third by Anita, throngh 1\11'1';.
Flores as gna1'dian ad litem, for Anita's personal injnrirs;
i

)
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the fourth by Mrs. Flores for the death of Felipe j the fifth
by Maria Zavala, mother of Nellie Zavala, for the death of
Nellie Zavala.
In each of the actions it was alleged that Brown was negligent and that, in hauling the trailer, he was acting as Murray's
agent.
Defendants denied negligence and pleaded contributory
negligence. Murray's motio11s for nonsuits and directed verdicts were denied. The trial court instructed the jury that
the contributory negligence of Mr. Flores would bar recovery
for his death and would also be imputed to Mrs. Flores to bar
recovery for her personal injuries. With respect to the other
three actions, the jury was instructed that the defense of contributory negligence of Mr. Flores was not applicable. The
jury returned the following verdicts:
1. In the Mr. Flores action, for defendants.
2. In the ltfrs. Flores action, for plaintiff in the amount
of $5,000. against both defendants.
3. In the Anita action, for plaintiff in the amount of
$15,000, against both defendants.
4. In the Filipr action. for plaintiff in the amount of
$5.000, against both defendants.
5. In the ZavaJa. action. for plaintiff in the amount of
$5,000, against both defendants.
The motions of both defendants for judgments notwithstanding the verdicts were denied.
Plaintiffs moved for a complete new trial in the Mr. Flores
action and for a limited new trial on the issue of damages
only in each of the other actions. Murray moved for a COIDplete new trial in each of the actions except the 1Ifr. Flores
action. Brown moved for a complete new trial in the Mrs.
Flores action and in the Felipe action.
The trial eourt granted a complete new trial as to all
actions. all parties. and all issnes. I n doing so he stated
that separate consideration of each motion might lead to a
new trial only of certain issllrs in certain actions, with the
result that the ca~e would hr evrn more complicated than
at the first trial. He also ohserved that the various vrrdicts
wrre not unanimons and wprr in pllrt 1nronsistent and that
they were prohahly rompJ'omifw wrdirts. He conrlnded that
"snbstllntial jnstirp" rf'fluirf'fl that tll{' entire ra!SP b(' retripd.
There is no apprnl from thp ordpr granting a complete
new trial in thp Mr. Flore!S artion. and tl1at order is now final.

I
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There is no appeal from the order granting a complete
new trial in the Mrs. Flores action, but Murray has appealed
from the judgment. Since the new trial order is now ftnal,
that jUdgment has been finally vacated and the appeal therefrom must be dismissed.
In the remaining three actions, plaintiffs have appealed
from the order granting complete new trials. Under the
provisions of rule 3a of the Rules on Appeal, Murray has
appealed from the judgment in each of these actions, and
Brown has appealed from the judgment in the Felipe action.
Since no question is raised as to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a finding of Brown's negligence or of
Mr. Flores's contributory negligence, it is unnecessary to
review the evidence relating to the happening of the accident.
Murray contends that there was no evidence that Brown
was his employee or agent, and that therefore the trial court
erred in denying his motions for judgments notwithstanding
the verdicts. The only evidence introduced on this issue was
the testimony of Brown and a deposition of Murray. It may
be summarized as follows: Both Brown and Murray were in
the trucking business and had known each other for many
years. Each owned a tractor and two trailers. A few weeks
before the accident, Brown has secured a contract to haul
pears from Lakeport to Yuba City during the canning season.
Since he did not have enough equipment to handle all of the
hauling himself, he arranged with Murray to assist him.
Murray sent his equipment and a driver from Los Angeles
to Lakeport. Brown used Murray's equipment on a trip to
trip basis and paid Murray for the amounts so hauled. The
job ended about two weeks before the accident, and Murray's
driver returned to Los Angeles with Murray's tractor and
one trailer, leaving the other trailer in Lakeport. Brown felt
obligated to assist Murra;\' in returning this second trailer to
Los Angeles, and in a conversation it was agreed that when
Brown was next in Lakeport with a tractor he would take
the trailer as far as King City, unless Murray had picked
it up sooner. Pursuant to this understanding Brown picked
ll}l) the trailer at Lakeport, and while he was hauling it to
King City, the accident occurred. Brown had business of
his own to attend to in IJakeport on the day he picked up the
trailer, but he would have made the trip in his automobile
rather than in his tractor, had hE' not planned to take Murray's
trailer to King City. No compensation waS contemplated
or given for this service.

')
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[1] Although it is clear from the foregoing evidence that
at the time of the accident, Brown was towing Murray's
trailer for the latter's benefit, Brown's negligence may be
imputed to Murray only if Brown was acting as his agent or
employee. If BrowJl was hauling the trailer as a mere
favor to Murray, or as an independent contractor, negligence
may not be imputed. (Edwards v. Freeman, 34 Cal.2d 589,
;,!)!:! [212 P.2d 883J ; lI/alloy v. Fong, 37 Ca1.2d 356, 370 [232
r.2d 241].)
[2] The primary test for determining whether a person
performing gratuitous services for another does so as the
latter's agent is the same as that applied to determine whether
one performing services for compensation does so as an employee or as au independent contractor, and in both situations the determinative issue is whether or not the alleged
principal controlled or had the legal right to control the
activities of the alleged agent. (Edwards v. Freeman, supra,
and cases cited; Malloy v. Fong, supra, and cases cited.) Accordingly, it is unnecessary to decide whether the jury could
reasonably infer that Brown was not acting gratuitously. It
need only be determined whether there is any evidence from
which the jury could infer that Murray had the right to control the manner in which the job was done.
There is nothing in the evidence of the business relations
between Brown and Murray from which that right could be
inferred. Both men were independent truckers, and Brown
had not in the past been Murray's employee. In fact the
evidence indicates that either Brown had employed Murray
or engaged him as an independent contractor to haul such
loads as Brown wished.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the jury could infer the
right to control from the fact that Brown was towing Murray's
trailer with permission for Murray's benefit. [3] It has
frequently been held that when one person is driving another's automobile for the latter's benefit an inference of
ageu('y may be drawn. (Souza v. Oorti, 22 Cal.2d 454, 461
[139 P.2d 645] ; Perry v. McLaughlin, 212 Cal. 1, 14 [297 P.
554] ; Gra! v. Harvey, 79 Cal.App.2d 64, 69 [179 P.2d 348];
Cope Y. Goble, 39 Cal.App.2d 448, 456 [103 P.2d 598] ; DuBois
Y. Owen, 16 Cal.App.2d 552, 556 [60 P.2d 1019].) In such
('ases the right to control may be inferred from the owner's
power over the way his automobile should be operated, particularly when he is present on the trip. [4] On the other
hand, it is settled that if one person is riding in another's

)
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automobile, the right to control may not be inferred merely
because the trip is undertaken for the passenger's benefit and
the destination is selected by him. (Edwards v. Freeman.
supra, 34 Cal.2d 589, 592, 593; Pope v. Halpern, 193 Cal.
168,174.176 [223 P. 470] ; Bryant v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co.,
174 Cal. 737, 742 [164 P. 385] ; Lowe v. Lee, 95 Cal.App.2d
685, 689 [213 P.2d 767]; Cox v. ](aufman, 77 Cal.App.2d
449,452 [175 P.2d 260] ; see, also, Stoddard v. Fiske, 35 Cal.
App. 607, 609·610 [170 P. 663}.) Similarly, the right to con·
trol may not be inferred merely from the fact that one per·
son with his own equipment is transporting another's goods.
(Clarke v. Hernandez, 79 Cal.App.2d 414, 424 [179 P.2d 834] ;
Preo v .. Roed, 99 Cal.App. 372, 380 [278 P. 928] ; see, also,
Gaskill v. Calavems Cement Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 120, 124
[226 P.2d 633]; Walton v. Donohue, 70 Cal.App. 309, 314
[233 P. 76].) In both of these latter situations in which an
owner is driving his own vehicle, the right to control its
operations will ordinarily rest with him, and accordingly, in
the absence of other evidence, it cannot be inferred that he
has surrendered that right by agreeing to carry the person or
property of another. [5] The facts of the present casc
bring it within the foregoing rule. Brown was towing Mur·
ray's trailer with his own equipment in carrying out an ap·
parently isolated transaction between the parties, and the
fact that he was towing Murray's property instead of carry·
ing his perSOll or his goods is immaterial. (Walt011 Y. Donohuc.
supra; Gask17Z·v. Calaveras Cement Co., supra.) Accordingly,
Murray's motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdicts
should have been granted.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting
complete new trials against Brown in the last three causes
of action instead of new trials limited to the issue of damag(>s.
Brown justifies the complete new trial order in the action for
the wrongful death of Felipe on the ground that the trial
court erred in instructing the jury that contributory negli.
gence on th(> part of Mr. Flores wou1(l not bar Mrs. Flores's
recovery for the death of Felipe. He relies upon Keena Y.
United RaiTt'oacTs of S.F., 57 Ca1.App. 124 [207 P. 351 ; C()s.~i
v. Southet'l1 Pac. Co., 110 Ca1.App. 110 [293 P. 6631: Du71
v. Atchison. T. & S.F. R. Co .. 27 Cal.App.2d 473 [81 P.2d
11)81: a110 Kafaoh'a v. May Dept. Rtorcs Co .. 60 0a1.App.2(1177
[140 P.2d 467], for the proposition that the negligenr(> of OIlC
par(>nt that contribnt(>s to the death of a minor ('hild mnst
be imputed to the othrr in any action for wrong-fnl d('atll

-
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against a third party. All of these cases dealt with negligence
on the part of the mother, and in each it was said that such
negligence would be imputed to the father, either because the
mother was acting as agent for the community in caring for
the child, or because tIle recovery would be community property in which she would have an interest.
[6] Since tIle mother and father are equally entitled to the
custody of a minor child (Civ. Code, § 197), if negligence is to
be imputed from one to the other on an agency theory it must
be because their relationship in caring for their child is in the
nature of a joint enterprise, each being the agent of the other.
In view of their equal ri~hts in this respect it cannot be said .
that the mother is necessarily the agent and the husband the
principal. [7] Since the decision in the Keena case, however, where the agency doctrine was enunciated, it has been
settled that the family relationship standing alone is not
sufficient to convert family activities into joint enterprises for
purposes of imputing negligence. (Oampagna v. Market St.
By. 00.,24 Ca1.2d 304. 309 r149 P.2d 281] ; Oox v. Kaufman,
77 Cal.App.2d 449, 452 [175 P.2d 260]. See, also, Spence v.
Fisher, 184 Cal. 209, 214 [193 P. 255. 14 A.L.R. 1083] ; Brya.nt
v. Pacific Electric Ry. 00 .. 174 Cal. 737. 742 [164 P. 3S!)] ; Sanfilippo v. Lesser, 59 Cal.App. 86. 88 [210 P. 44]; Ht1Z v.
Jacquemart, 55 Cal.App. 498, 501·502 r203 P. 1021].)
Since there is no evidence in addition to the family relationship of a joint enterprise between Mr. and Mrs. Flores,
Mr. Flores's negligence may be imputE'd to his .wife, if at all,
only because the cause of action for the wrongful death of
FE'lipe was community property.
[8] In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, it is
settled that a cause of action for injnrirs to E'ither the husband.
or the wife arising during the marriagE' and while they are i
livin~ tOf:!ether is community pr(lpert;\' (Zaragosa v. Oraven, !
33 Ca1.2d 315. 318·321 [202 P.2d 731. and cases cited). and;
the same rule is applicable to a canse of aetion for the wrong- •
fnI death of a minor child, or for dama!!es suffered by the
parents bE'C'anse of injmy to sl1ch a child. (Fuentes v. T1tc1rer,
31 Ca1.2d 1. ]0 [187 P.2d 7521; Orane v. Ftmith, 23 CaUd
288.30] fl44 P.2rl 3!)61 : l;ranifhrrg v. JlfrG171'ray-Raymo1ld etc.
On .• 66 Cal.App. 261. 272 [226 P. 281.). [9] Aeeorilingly. in
all of these situations it is orilinari1~' ne('essar~' to impute the
negligpnee of one spons(' to thE' other to prevent the negligent
sponse from profitinl! b;\' his own wron~. OIooifll v. Smtthem
Par.. Co., 167 Cal. 786, 790 [141 P. 388] j Ba,'1ler v. Sacramento

)
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Gas d'; Elcc. Co., 158 Cal. 514, 518 (111 P. 530, Ann.Cas.
1912,A. 642] ; see, also, no~cllbloom Y. Southern Pac. Co., 59

)

Cal.App. 102, 107 [210 P. 53].) [10] When the marriage is
dissolved, howevt>r, the illterests ill any of these causes of action
become separate property, and it becomes possible to segregate tIle elements of damages that would, except for the community property s~'stel1l, be considered personal to each
spouse. Under these cireulllstances the .objective of preventing unjust enrichment nlUY be accomplished by barring only
the interest of the negligent spouse or his estate.
[11] Mr. Flores died in the same accident in which his
wife was injured. To allow her to recoyer for her personal
injuries will in no way enrich Mr. Flores or those who might
tal\e through him. Similarly, there will be no unjust enrichment if Mrs. Flores is allowed to recoyer for the wrongful
death of her son. [12] Damages for wrongful death are the
sum of those sllfrered by each heir or parent (Fuentes v. ,
Tucker, 31 Ca1.2d 1, 10 [187 P.2d 752] ; Estate 0/ Riccomi, 185
Cal. 458, 462 [197 P. 97, 14 A.L.R. 509J), and accordingly,
when the heirs are not husband and wife, the negligence of one
is not imputed to the others because the recovery may be
limited to the nonnegligent heirs. (Bowler v. Roos, 213 Cal.
484, 485-486 [2 P.2d 817] ; Bowen v. Kizir1'an, 105 Cal.App.
286,290 [287 P. 570].) Similarly, in this case the damages
will be limited to those suffered by Mrs. Flores and the recovery will be hers alone.
[13] It is contended, howe,7er, that the rights of the parties arising out of an accident must be determined as of the
time that the causes of action arise, and that the right to
recoyer for personal injuries or the wrongful death of a minor child should not turn upon the chance of whether or not
the plaintiff's spouse suryiYes until after the statute of limitations has run or judgment has been rendered. It is not
unusual, howeyer, for the chance chronology of death to
determine "'hether recoyery may be had. It does so in all
tort actions that abate 011 tIle death of ou(> or the other of the
parties. It would goyern here, even if we wpre to hold that
the determinative issue was whpthcr Felipe died before or
after his fatller. If h(' dird after his father, his mother's
action for his wrong-ul death could in no eyent be considered
community prop'.'rty. Althongh there is eyiclenc(' from whicl1
the jur;v could have fmmel that Mr. Flores sUrYiyed his son,
we think this issue was properly not presented to them. Undonbtedly, convenience and certainty in litigation would be
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fi('I"YPll if fad" oC('lIITing after tIl(' aecrual of a cause of action
('011111 be ignorcd, hilt benefits so achieved would be far outwpiglll'(l b,V the hardship and injustice of applying a rule de!;ignerl to prevent unjust. enrichment after the reason for it has
ceased to cxist. (Scc Ci\,. Code, § 3510.) [14] When the
hllfihall(l is dead, Bot olll~' is tIll' rea"on for the rule imputing
his }H'gligl'llee to llis wife gone, bnt to apply it defeats its
(J\\"ll pll1'pose. It is but a windfall to a defendant who negli~('lIt I,V injures a wife or causes the death of a minor child
that I'c('o\'('l'y may be barred because the wife's husband was
also llcgligent. Although allowing the negligent defendant
to escape liability has been considered a l.esser evil than allowillg the negligent spouse to profit from his own wrong, surely
the former evil may not be balanced by the latter when the latter is no longer present. [15] Accordingly, the order grant- '
ing a complete new trial cannot be sustained on the ground that
tIl(' trial court erred in instructing the jury that negligence of
1\11'. Flores, if any, would not be a defense to Mrs. Flores's
!I<·tioll for the wrongful death of Felipe. '1'0 the extent that
Solko v. Jones, 117 Cal.App. 372 [3 P.2d 1028]; Cossi v.
Southern Pac. Co., 110 Cal.App. 110 [293 P. 663] ; and Dull
Y. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 27 Cal.App.2d 473 [81 P.2d
158], are inconsistent with the forcgoing they are disapproved.
Brown did not move for a new trial in the actions for
Anita Flores's personal injuries and for Maria Zavala '8
wrongfnl death, and as indicated aboye, his motion for a new
tl·ial in the action for the wrongful death of Felipe cannot be
"npported on the ground that. the jury was erroneously inst mcted with respect to imputed negligence. Plaintiffs, how(,yt'I', moved for a new trial on the issue of damages alone in
all of these actions. The question is presented, therefore,
whether ill yiew of plaintiffs' motions, the court erred in
grantillg a new trial on all issues against Brown in these
ad ions.
[16] It has recently been settled that when the issues of
liabilit~· and damages are so interwoyen that a new trial
limited to damages alone would be unfair to the defendant,
the trial court may order a complete new trial although the .
olll~' motion is b J' the plaintiff for a limited new trial. (HartUl- 1
"rtki Y. Plotho, ante. p. 602 [248 P.2d 910].)
In the present case the wrdicts were not unanimous, and
the verdict in the action for the wrongful death of Mr.
FlorI'" was inconsistent, under the instructions given, with
1l1l' \'('rdiet in the action for the personal injuries of Mrs.

)
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Flores. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the
trial court erred in concluding that the verdicts were probably the result of compromise and that substantial justice reIIHired a comp]cte new trial.
The appeals from the judgments are dismissed. Thc order
Ilellying Murray's motion for judgments notwithstanding the
verdicts as to the last three causes of action is reversed and
tIle trial court is directed to grant his motion as to those actions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629.) The order granting a new
trial is reversed to the extent that it orders a new trial against
Murray in those actions, and affirmed to the extent it orders
a new trial against Brown. Murray shall recover his costs on
appeal. The other parties shall bear their own costs.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Shaner, J., and Spence,
.T., concurred.

)
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CARTER, J.-I dissent.
On the question of limited new trials, I adhere to the views
expressed by me in Leipet·t v. Honold, ante, p. 471 [247 P.2d
324], and Hamasaki v. Flotho, ante, p. 613 [248 P.2d 910].
In addition, however, I believe that it was proper to deny defendant Murray's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict against him, because it is quite clear that the evidenee was sufficient to show that defendant Brown was aeting
as Murray's agent at tIle time of the aecident and the latter
was therefore liable on the basis of respondeat superior.
From the record it appears that while the contract was being
performed Brown and Murray were engaged in either a
joint trucking enterprise or Murray was the agent of Brown
as thc latter had the contract and was using Murray's trailer
in the performance of the trucking operation. Although the
trueking work had been finished, Murray's trailer was still
at the place of operation, many miles from Murray's home
and place of business in Los Angeles and from whenee it
eame when the trueking job was commenced. Hence the
association between Brown and Murra~' was still in existence.
As the con('ll1ding step ill .the assoeiation, Brown felt obligatl'll to l\Iu1'I'ay to ai(l in rt'tnrning tIle latter's trailer to
IJos Angeles a1l(1 hence agl'el'd tllat Ill' would pick up the
1!'ailel' and returll it to TJos Angeles. That lit', did.' and the
/I1'l'ident ol'('l1rrell while ]Il' was ()nthat trip. There is a
e1l'ar infereJlce from tlH'se faets tllllt Brown was acting as
Murray's agent on that trip. It is conceded by the majority
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that where a person drives another's automobile for the latter's benefit (precisely the instant case) an inference or
presumption arises that the driver is acting as the owner's
agent. That such is the law has been held in many cases. It is
said in Souza v. Oorti, 22 Ca1.2d 454,461 [139 P.2d 645] : ".As
to the liability of the defendant Arthur GigH, the record
shows that defendant Corti took possession of the Dodge car
for the use, benefit and accommodation and under the direction of .Arthur and for the purpose of taking it to Rocca's
for Arthur. Under these circumstances .Arthur was the principal and Corti was his agent. The negligence of the latter
was therefore imputable to Arthur."
The same rule has been stated repeatedly (Mabertov. Wolfe,
106 Cal.App. 202 (289 P. 218] ; McWhirter v. Fuller, 85 Cal.
App. 288 [170 P. 417] ; Randoll)h v. Hunt, 41 Cal.App. 739
[183 P. 358] ; Dierks v. Newsom, 49 Cal.App. 789 [194 P. 518] ;
Navarro v. Somerfeld, 35 Cal.App.2d 35 [94 P.2d 623];
Gates v. Pendleton, 184 Cal. 797 [195 P. 664] i Jacobus v.
Brero, 190 Cal. 374 [212 P. 617] ; Grover v. Sharp & Fellows
etc. Co., 66 Cal.App.2d 736 [153 P.2d 83J ; Graf v. Harvey!
79 Cal.App.2d 64 [179 P.2d 348].)
Hence in the instant case an inference arises that Brown
was Murray's agent which is sufficient to justify the verdicts
against Murray.
The majority endeavors to evade that rule by stating that
the case is more like one where a trip is tal{en in the owner's
car for a passenger's benefit, in which it is said that the
cases hold there is no inference that the owner is the passenger's agent, or where one is transporting another's goods '
in the former's car, in which the ,cases are said to hold that
there is no inference of agency. That answer is not satisfactory for several reasons. There is no sound reason why
the rule should be any different merely because Brown was
towing Murray's trailer with his own truck. The fact remains that he was operating Murray's trailer and his own
truck on the J)ighway for Murray's benefit. The case is not
like those relied upon b~' the majority such as Edwards v.
Freemam, 34 Cal.2d 589 [212 P.2d 883], where the owner
of the car did nothing more than give a ride to his mother
to town where she had her e~'es tested. She was merely
being given a ride in the owner's car. It was not a case of
a person (Brown) operating another's (Murray's) trailer on
the highways for tIle benefit of the latter. Here there was a
ch'ar bllsin,ess relationship between Brown and Murray that
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was still continuing when the accident happened. To take
from the jury this issue of fact is just another instance in
which the majority has deprived a litigant of his right to a
jury trial in violation of the constitutional mandate.
In yjew of the fact that a motion for a complete new trial
,ras made in each of tIle actions the court had the power to
!rrant the same. This is true even though the motion in Mr.
Plores's action was made by plaintiff and a similar motion
was made by defendant Murray in each of the other actions
and by defendant Brown in the Mrs. Flores and Felipe
actions. Therefore, we are not faced with the problem presented in the Hamasaki case; supra, where the only motion
granted by the trial court was plaintiff's motion for a new
trial on the issue of damages only.
I would, therefore, affirm both the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts and the
order granting a complete new trial on all issues.
Plaintiffs and appellants' petition for a rehearing was
denied November 3, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

